Trump’s second term focuses on strengthening U.S. military and technological power through executive orders. Key moves include missile defense and AI policy shifts, which heighten tensions with China. With China seen as a major threat, especially over fentanyl trafficking, these actions are set to redefine U.S.-China relations and global dynamics.
The Weave: China Policy and Trump’s Executive Orders
Author: Bonnie Girard
Since Donald Trump was inaugurated as the 47th president of the United States on January 20, he has followed through with his campaign promises to address issues ranging from immigration to military preparedness to education by fiat through the vehicle of the executive order. Although most of these orders do not directly name China as their target, they aim to bolster the overall capability of the United States to field and support an enhanced military force and to establish itself as the world’s leader in science and technology, including artificial intelligence (AI). As a whole, Trump’s executive orders are certain to draw China’s attention.
Among the executive orders sure to attract interest in China is one directing the “implementation of a next-generation missile defense shield for the United States against ballistic, hypersonic, advanced cruise missiles, and other next-generation aerial attacks.”
Titled “The Iron Dome for America,” Trump’s executive order “also secures the supply chains for all components of the system,” noting that “the threat of attack by ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles remains a catastrophic threat facing the United States.
On artificial intelligence (AI), Trump has rescinded a Biden executive order that “established unnecessarily burdensome requirements for companies developing and deploying AI that would stifle private sector innovation and threaten American technological leadership.” That Biden era regulation, according to Trump’s new executive order abolishing it, “hampered the private sector’s ability to innovate in AI by imposing government control over AI development and deployment.”
Further executive orders establish the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) to spearhead U.S. innovation and competitiveness in critical and emerging technologies; establishment of an America First Trade Policy; withdrawing the United States from the World Health Organization; and putting America First in International Environmental Agreements. All of these have implications for and potential impacts on the China-U.S. relationship.
A review of the executive orders and presidential actions that Trump has so far signed and implemented seems to indicate that little attention has been paid to China specifically, with the exception of an order extending the life of TikTok in the United States for 75 days. Yet it would be a mistake to assume the administration is ignoring China. According to Trump’s new secretary of state, Marco Rubio, China is the United States’ “biggest threat.”
Rubio was unequivocal on that point during his five-hour Senate confirmation hearing. “If we don’t change course, we are going to live in the world where much of what matters to us on a daily basis from our security to our health will be dependent on whether the Chinese allow us to have it or not,” Rubio testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Rubio’s warning carries weight. He was confirmed to his post by a vote of 99-0; no Democrat voted against him. That bipartisan agreement extends to his assessment of the threat that China poses.
Trump agrees. In comments made at the White House on the afternoon of January 30, Trump said, “With China I’m also thinking about something, because they’re sending fentanyl into our country, causing us hundreds of thousands of deaths.”
Trump continued, “China’s going to end up paying a tariff on that. We’ll make a determination on what it’s going to be. China has to stop sending fentanyl into our country and killing our people.”
The Diplomat spoke with Dr. Andrew Payne, a lecturer in foreign policy and security at City St George’s, University of London, about the issue of the China-U.S. relationship. Payne’s research examines the politics of U.S. foreign policy; he is the author of the book, “War on the Ballot How the Election Cycle Shapes Presidential Decision-Making in War.”
Payne noted that during the presidential campaign, China, far from being the big issue which many expected would dominate the discussion, became instead “the dog that didn’t bark.”
Essentially, he suggested, Democrats and Republicans “have coalesced toward the position of ‘China bad,’” making that assessment “an increasingly bipartisan position.” And, he added, “the electorate doesn’t pay attention to the details,” or presumably, the differences between each party’s positions, “sufficiently to distinguish between them.”
Payne went on: “Unlike other issues, views in America about China don’t really fall along party lines, they fall along generational lines… older generations tend to see China more as a threat, and that’s because they see it through the prism of a Cold War.”
On the other hand, Payne continued, “the younger generation… have grown up with ‘Made in China,’ and they’re all on TikTok. They don’t necessarily see [China] that way.” Therefore, “we can say more about the character of policymaking than we can about the direction.”
Payne said that he doesn’t think that Trump has “a 10-point plan in his pocket” with regards to China policy. He added, “There’s not going to be a choreographed implementation of a big strategy toward China… manifestation of policy can turn on a dime. I think that will continue.”
And despite a general bipartisan consensus on China, “There is a much greater diversity of thought on China in the administration than I have seen” before, Payne said. With that in mind, “a lot will depend on who actually controls China policy within the administration.”
However, there is another perspective to consider on Trump’s policy positions and actions toward China going forward.
Trump frequently refers to his expression of ideas as a “weave.” During campaign rallies, he often started out talking about one subject, left it for a tangential one, and repeated that process several times over before coming back to his original point. He called it a “weave,” saying that no matter how far away he got from the original idea, he always came back and finalized his remarks with that beginning thought, making a cohesive whole of the entire discussion.
That process may manifest in Trump’s policies as well. On China, he has several potential starting points on which to begin his “weave” of ideas. The deadly fentanyl issue is a good place to start and already has Trump’s attention. But ultimately all of Trump’s policy prescriptions will reshape the United States’ relationship with China, whether directly or tangentially.
Credits: TCA, LLC.