The Diplomat
India would gain if Japan steps up as a stronger geopolitical force in Asia to balance China. With rising China tensions and possible U.S. pullback, a remilitarized Japan under Takaichi Sanae could ease pressure on India and reshape regional power dynamics.
Why Japanese Remilitarization Would be Good for India
Author: Akhilesh Pillalamarri
India’s foreign policy would benefit enormously if Japan were to play a greater role in the geopolitics of Asia. India’s strategic situation would be shored up if Japan were to capitalize on its economic and technological prowess, along with its latent military strength, to balance against China.
Détente between India and China is unlikely to go anywhere because the logic of their rivalry is too strong. Temporary India-U.S. tensions — which are already on their way to resolution — do not alter the larger structural forces that shape Asian geopolitics. Japan, too, cannot alter the fact that its major geopolitical challenge is its contentious relationship with China. Recent events have demonstrated this, particularly China’s ballistic reaction to Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s November 2025 comment that a Chinese attack on Taiwan would draw in Japanese forces. China is clearly unnerved by the prospect of a militarily assertive Japan.
Both India and Japan would buttress each other’s position by virtue of being located at the opposite geographic ends of a common rival. The ancient Sanskrit treatise on politics, the Arthashastra, spells this out clearly: “one with an immediately contiguous territory is a natural enemy… one with a territory once removed is the natural ally.” Thus, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s minister of external affairs, has often written and spoken of India’s need to “[bring] Japan into play,” noting that “because they work at their own speed… we are trying to make them move faster.”
Why Japan in particular — and not, say the U.S. or the Philippines — matters to India is due to a number of reasons, beyond the fact that modern India and Japan, and their politicians, seem to genuinely love each other. The United States is half a world away from Asia and it may not always be interested in or be involved there. Some strands of American foreign policy thinking advocate separating from Asia and conceding a sphere of influence for China. Other Asian countries, such as the Philippines, Vietnam, or South Korea, may not be able to balance against China as smaller powers.
Japan, on the other hand, has the size, economy, and potential military capability to counter China. Its location, off the coast of eastern China, where China’s population and economic centers are concentrated, represents an enormous latent threat. Japan’s geography — from the edge of the Kuril Islands with Russia through its four main islands to the Ryukyu Islands, almost up to Taiwan — is a part of the First Island Chain, a string of islands that form a maritime barrier between China and the rest of the world. In recent history — during World War II — Japan demonstrated that it had the ability to seize major portions of China, including its major cities, a fact that still gives many in China pause.
Most importantly — from India’s perspective — is a longstanding tradition in Japanese strategic culture that forecloses close cooperation with China. If China were to shift more of its focus to the security of its heartland vis-à-vis Japan, it would take a lot of pressure off India, particularly on the Indo-Chinese Himalayan border and in regards to China’s ability to influence or support other states in South Asia, such as Pakistan or Bangladesh. Japanese leaders long believed that for the sake of its security, it was necessary for a Japanese sphere of influence — or empire — to extend westward from Japan to the Asian mainland, especially in Korea and northeastern China. It would be contrary to Japanese interests for any strong power to emerge in that area, especially Russia or China.
The U.S. defeat of Japan in World War II, the subsequent American occupation of Japan, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, and the inclusion of Article 9 — renouncing war — in the post-war Japanese constitution, all put a lid on this imperative for several decades. But the forces of geography and history can only be held back for so long before they reemerge. Today, a strong, newly empowered China, threatens Japanese interests and Japan must make provision for its own security. After all, U.S. disinterest in Asia impacts Japan as much as it impacts India — perhaps even more, because Japan is closer to China’s heartland and must maintain a heightened vigilance of its geopolitical situation because of its size, insular nature, and lack of natural resources.
A geopolitically re-engaged Japan as a major player in the Asian security sphere is what counts as bringing Japan into play, from the Indian perspective. Its remilitarization — either through re-interpretating Article 9 of its constitution, or through its outright abolishment — would be a net positive for other states in Asia that fear the hegemony of one power in Asia, especially if the United States steps back. The fear, often disingenuously expressed by China, that this would result in a repeat of Japan’s pre-war militarism and imperialism is largely unfounded, as it fails to take shifts in post-war Japanese culture and thinking into account.
The recent landslide victory of Takaichi and her Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan’s February 8 elections is therefore cause for celebration in New Delhi. A major factor in her victory was her image as a strong leader, as someone who held her ground despite Chinese pressure to withdraw her comments in the aftermath of her suggestion that Japan would support Taiwan in the case of an attack. The Japanese people seem to have accepted the new geopolitical realities that Japan must now face, as well as the prospect of U.S. unreliability. As Jio Kamata suggested in The Diplomat, Takaichi’s victory suggests that Japan’s political “debate has moved from the legitimacy of self-defense to the quality and effectiveness of Japan’s defensive capacity.” With her new majority in parliament, Takaichi may be able to enact reforms to strengthen Japan’s armed forces and use them more flexibly, lift restrictions on exporting arms, create a new national intelligence agency, and perhaps even revise Japan’s constitution.
India can only benefit from a remilitarized Japan and has almost nothing to lose. It is already a beneficiary of Japanese technology and know-how; it stands to gain from acquiring Japanese weaponry too. Indian and Japanese geopolitical interests converge for the most part — except, perhaps, in their attitudes toward Russia — and they have a common strategic imperative that necessitates countering China. This is especially vital if the U.S. takes a step back from Asia. Although both Japan and India already work well together and have cooperated on many fronts, including diplomacy, a militarily assertive Japan — more than anything else — could be a game-changer for India’s strategic and geopolitical position.
Credits: TCA, LLC.