The Diplomat
As America’s reliability comes into question, India has an opportunity to rethink its relationship with China in an increasingly multipolar world.
How India’s Geopolitical Position Would Improve With Better China Ties
Author: Akhilesh Pillalamarri
At the meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the recent BRICS summit in New Delhi, Modi is said to have assured Xi that India’s foreign policy was independent of influence by any third party, a statement taken to imply the United States.
While India and China have a long way to go before their relations normalize, the bilateral relationship, which had derailed following the 2020 Galwan clashes, has improved. And especially with the U.S. under Trump increasingly treating India less as a partner, New Delhi is looking to build relations with other powers, including China. By improving ties, India and China would both accentuate their geopolitical positions.
In the past year, the U.S. war in Iran, continuing Iranian and Ukrainian resilience against foreign attacks, the growing rifts between the U.S. and many of its allies or partners — including Canada, the European Union, and India — Russia’s persistence and adaptation in prosecuting the war in Ukraine despite heavy losses, and the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) all lead to one conclusion: the multipolar world has arrived faster than anticipated, and is in fact already here. Each country and each polity should be prepared to be flexible and seek out what is in its best interests.
A new geopolitical order is already emerging in Asia. Although no contemporary Congress of Vienna has established a definitive list of new great powers, four countries — China, Russia, India, and Iran — are actively shaping the evolving geopolitical order in Asia. Despite their differences, they are members of both the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS and persistently exercise power across the oceans surrounding Asia and overland across Eurasia. Now, as was the case over a millennium ago, Sinic, Indic, Inner Asian, and Persian polities are pillars of an Asian geopolitical order.
In this multipolar world, India’s policy of pursuing strategic autonomy suddenly looks more reasonable, since it is becoming increasingly conceivable that a post-Trump America would be similarly disinterested in balancing against China, supporting India, or pivoting back to Asia. The U.S. government has shown less interest in the security of allies, such as South Korea and Taiwan. Surveys have shown that this is the spirit of the future, as younger Americans are less concerned about foreign policy in general, and China specifically, with less than half of Millennials and Gen Z viewing China’s rise as a world power as a threat. On the other hand, negative perceptions of India have increased in the United States.
It makes sense for India to continue to improve and build on its ties with the United States and its allies, especially those in West Asia, as this facilitates investment, education, and technological transfer. At the same time, détente and even closer relations with China and other Eurasian powers are also in India’s interest.
If the United States does not perceive China as a threat requiring balancing against, then there is significantly less reason for India to prioritize close ties with the U.S. or participate in groupings like Quad. India would be less assured of U.S. help in the event of a conflict along its border with China. As evidence of changing U.S. priorities, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) has reverted to its old name, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM).
But this situation need not be a great setback for India, because it can be an opportunity to resolve most of its core geopolitical issues, above and beyond its uncertain relationship with the United States. Even if the border issue cannot be resolved right away, if it is put on the back burner (as China has long wanted), a better relationship would be a boon. It would allow New Delhi to consolidate its status in South Asia and redeploy resources along its border with Pakistan. It would allow India to sidestep Pakistan and reconnect — through Xinjiang — with its Central Asian backyard, a region that it has had long historic ties with. India would be able to focus more on development and industrialization, even if China does not facilitate this.
Despite the persistence of the China-India border dispute, the two countries are mostly indifferent toward each other and do not have deeply antagonistic historical or civilizational disputes. The present Chinese state’s cold stance toward India is mostly the function of a particular strategic outlook, which views China as the dominant power in the region and expects other states to accommodate themselves to its interests, regardless of their own perspectives. But previous Chinese states had another outlook. For example, Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the Kuomintang (Nationalist) government in China during World War II, was well-disposed to Indian independence and to India becoming an Asian power.
China’s stance would have to change, of course, but it would have relatively little to lose. Closer ties with a stronger India would not significantly weaken its core geopolitical position in Asia or, domestically, in Tibet, and could in fact ease security pressure on one of its flanks. And India would continue to grow economically anyway.
Any Chinese vision of a new geopolitical world order would also look more credible if it is able to enlist New Delhi as a partner, given its size and population. It would be in China’s interests to put aside some of its conceptions of India as a “braggart” and treat India with respect as a fellow great power. Here the example of Russia is instructive. Ever since the two nations signed the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689, China dealt with Russia as an equal power with its own interests and sphere of influence rather than as one of its tributaries, such as Korea. Even today, though China has the upper hand in its relationship with Russia, it treats Moscow— and President Vladimir Putin — with pomp and deference. China is therefore able to reconcile power asymmetries with a pragmatic show of equality and sensitivity if it serves China’s needs or if China respects the other state. Continued Indian military and economic growth will make it harder for China to avoid recognizing India as a peer.
Both countries — but India, especially — have much to gain geopolitically by improving relations with each other in an increasingly multipolar world. They could do so by both making limited concessions.
For India, this would require putting the border issue on the back burner and becoming more friendly to Chinese businesses. For China, this would entail treating India more like it treats Russia, as a fellow great power and civilizational state, a position that would not be hard to justify given India’s size, population, and lack of ability or desire to threaten core China’s status as Asia’s prime power. If New Delhi can persuade China to change its stance toward India and pursue détente, it would greatly ease India’s geopolitical, strategic, and economic position, without hurting China’s.
Credits: TCA, LLC.