The Diplomat

India and Pakistan’s 65-year-old water treaty is facing its biggest crisis yet, caught between political tensions, legal battles, and climate change.
Rethinking the Indus Waters Treaty in an Era of Climate Uncertainty
Author: Jahan Taganova, Saleem H. Ali, Ambika Vishwanath
In April 2025, India placed the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) “in abeyance” following a deadly militant attack in Pahalgam, in Indian-administered Kashmir. Long regarded as a rare example of hydrological cooperation amid enduring regional conflict, the treaty is now facing a crisis that exposes its deeper structural shortcomings.
In a recent peer-revied paper published in the journal Nature Water, we suggest that this crisis presents an opportunity to better incorporate science and transboundary water law into a renegotiated treaty.
On August 31, 2026, the Court of Arbitration, with the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) serving as its secretariat, unanimously ruled that India’s stated grounds did not justify suspending or terminating the treaty under the agreement or applicable international law. It affirmed that the IWT remains fully in force and that India remains bound by its obligations. India rejected the award, disputed the tribunal’s jurisdiction, and reaffirmed that its decision to keep the treaty in abeyance remains in effect.
This impasse carries significant implications for Pakistan’s water security and the broader stability of South Asia. Yet the future of the IWT cannot be secured through legal interpretations alone. It requires a more fundamental rethink: integrating evolving scientific knowledge, climate realities, and contemporary principles of international water law into a framework capable of addressing the shared challenges of the Indus Basin.
Signed in September 1960, the IWT was designed primarily to address water allocation through an engineering-centered approach, at a time when environmental considerations were largely absent from international water negotiations.
In many ways current debates over the treaty, played out through competing legal and political narratives, also miss crucial aspects of shifting climate realities. At a January 2026 U.N. Security Council Arria-formula meeting, Pakistan’s permanent representative, Ambassador Asim Iftikhar Ahmad, characterized India’s position as a violation of international legal obligations with humanitarian, environmental, and security implications. In May, former Indian Indus Waters Commissioner P.K. Saxena published a two-part critique of the treaty, questioning its historical allocation arrangements and arguing that Pakistan had weaponized its dispute-resolution mechanisms.
Amid these competing narratives, a more fundamental question remains insufficiently addressed: What would it take to modernize the treaty’s legal and institutional architecture while integrating scientific knowledge, environmental sustainability, and the political realities of transboundary water cooperation? Climate variability, shifting monsoon patterns, glacier melt, increasingly severe floods and droughts, groundwater stress, and ecological degradation expose the limitations of relying on historical hydrological assumptions and rigid river-allocation arrangements.
“These new issues are not unique to the Indus River. They highlight the need for all shared watersheds to be cooperatively and sustainably managed for 21st century challenges,” Peter Gleick, a hydroclimatologist and member of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, explained.
The Indus basin’s vulnerability makes a stronger case for moving beyond volumetric water allocation toward the joint management of shared risks and benefits. Ranked as the most vulnerable of the world’s 78 water towers and home to the second most stressed underground water reserve, the Indus basin faces growing pressures from climate change. These challenges call for climate-informed planning, transparent data sharing, and coordinated approaches to flood and drought management.
The principles set out in Articles 8 and 9 of the U.N. Watercourses Convention, cooperation, and the regular exchange of data and information, could help inform the modernization of the IWT.
“Making the treaty more environmentally responsive requires both countries to take greater responsibility for water quality. India must strengthen controls on untreated sewage and industrial effluent entering Pakistan, while Pakistan must address pollution flowing into the Ravi and Sutlej from its own territory. Article IV(10) already provides a basis for bilateral cooperation on pollution control,” explained Syed Mohammad Ali, a lecturer at Johns Hopkins University.
Regular and transparent data exchange, supported by shared monitoring and analytical tools over non-contentious aspects of the resource, including the use of artificial intelligence and machine learning, could improve assessments of precipitation, groundwater systems, future water availability, and disaster risks. Such mechanisms would also help address data discrepancies that can deepen mistrust.
The need for cooperation is tangible. In July 2023, thousands of farmers in central-eastern Pakistan saw their crops submerged after India released water from the Sutlej to mitigate flash floods in its northern regions. Several Indian states that year received above-normal monsoons, illustrating the need to calibrate shifting climate patterns into basin-wide water management. Here, joint flood forecasting and coordinated reservoir operations could help both countries manage these risks while creating opportunities for mutual benefit.
A more flexible treaty would also require a shift from dividing water to sharing the benefits that flow from its cooperative management. The IWT’s east-west river allocation was designed around the hydrological knowledge and political priorities of the 1950s. It does not adequately account for today’s population pressures, ecosystem and domestic growth needs, or changing climate risks. Rather than treating upstream and downstream interests as inherently competing, India and Pakistan could apply the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization to identify opportunities for mutual gains. Joint hydropower development, coordinated irrigation scheduling, and shared flood-management infrastructure could help move negotiations beyond a zero-sum approach toward basin-wide resilience. The economic case is also significant: recent modelling cited in our research estimates that cooperation across the Indus Basin could enable sustainable development at a 9 percent lower cost than pursuing it without cooperation.
“Renegotiating the Indus Waters Treaty does not mean starting from scratch,” Yueming Yan, an assistant professor in the Faculty of Law, Chinese University of Hong Kong, told us. “The treaty itself allows amendments by mutual agreement. The priority is to translate core principles of international water law into practical commitments on climate adaptation, environmental protection, and data sharing. A strengthened, multilayered dispute resolution framework, with clearer timelines and greater opportunities for mediation, could help resolve disputes more effectively.”
An existing global framework could help translate these ambitions into measurable progress. SDG Indicator 6.5.2, which tracks the proportion of a country’s transboundary basin area covered by operational cooperation arrangements, offers a practical benchmark for assessing progress in the Indus Basin. The reality is that steps need to be incremental with an understanding that the relationship is extremely complex and uncertain at the best of times. The indicator offers a useful starting point for measuring institutional cooperation beyond the resolution of individual disputes.
Modernization must also address weaknesses in the treaty’s dispute-resolution architecture. Three reforms are particularly important. First, clearer indicative timelines for the main stages of neutral expert and arbitration proceedings could reduce prolonged uncertainty while preserving flexibility for technically complex cases. Second, the treaty should clarify the respective jurisdictions of the neutral expert and the Court of Arbitration, reducing procedural overlap and the risk of parallel proceedings. Third, it should provide for mutually agreed third-party mediation or facilitation as a complement to existing mechanisms.
Negotiators at COP31 should build on the Baku Dialogue on Water for Climate Action and consider the role of multinational institutions in facilitating riparian cooperation. The adaptation mechanisms which are also being deliberated could have a regional framing that is more science-based and provide an opportunity for cooperative paths. Our multilateral recommendations do not aim to replace the Permanent Indus Commission or formal adjudication; but to create space for technical dialogue, confidence-building, and de-escalation before disagreements become entrenched legal and political disputes.
The current crisis is not simply a dispute over treaty interpretation. It is a crisis of confidence in a framework that must now respond to a fundamentally different hydrological, environmental, and political landscape. An IWT 2.0 should not be understood as a concession by either country, and nor is it an overhaul of the entire treaty forcing India and Pakistan to go back to the drawing board. It is an opportunity to modernize an agreement in ways that advance their shared interests such as water security, climate resilience, economic development, and ecological sustainability. The Indus Water Treaty has long been hailed as a measure of success within the broader global debate on transboundary water cooperation, even during times of extreme crisis – a renewed treaty that brings modern science and climate knowledge into its functioning can once again prove its case.
Credits: TCA, LLC.